Between the periods of the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Nuremberg trials, a select number of psychiatrists were tasked with evaluating Nazi generals to assess their mental state and determine whether shared psychological characteristics might help explain their heinous crimes. Shockingly, the concluding finding was that these men were psychologically ordinary. As R.G. Collingwood observed in The New Leviathan (1942), “The only clue to what man can do is what man has done,” a truth reflected in the extraordinary acts of ordinary people during the war. This therefore raises the question is anyone inherently evil? Or rather brought to such measures because of oppression or brainwashing? This reflects Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” suggesting that extreme violence can arise not from monstrous intent but from ordinary individuals operating within accepted systems and orders.
“The only clue to what man can do is what man has done”
R. G. Collingwood
Throughout history the ‘winners’ in war are cherished for their accomplishments and have their unlawful or unethical actions overlooked and excused as necessity, whilst the ‘losers’ suffer the real punishment. This selective justice is apparent even in the Second World War; Allied war crimes were rarely prosecuted, reiterating the idea that accountability is often shaped by victory rather than legality. This raises the question: is justice being served?
Killing today has become so comfortable that responsibility dissolves across systems and hierarchies. The engineer creates the bomb, the politician authorises its use and the soldier pushes a button, each are isolated from the outcome. When violence is produced collectively rather than individually, lines of legal responsibility can become blurred, allowing crime to persist without consequence. By removing the humanity of those killed, violence becomes easier to justify. In an era of remote warfare, death is delivered with unprecedented ease and minimal moral friction.
The Nuremberg Trials helped establish the foundations of modern international criminal law, shaping principles of military accountability and influencing the United Nations’ conventions on war crimes and crimes against humanity (as is clear in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations). Despite their historical significance, the Nuremberg Trials established accountability more in principle than in practice, prosecuting only a narrow group of offenders.
However, legal frameworks often struggle to keep up with the scale, technology and complexity of contemporary atrocities, creating a persistent gap between moral responsibility and legal accountability. Even within societies, opinions on legitimacy of killing remains conflicted. In Death Sentences and Executions (2023), Amnesty International reports that, globally the death penalty is more opposed than it is supported, yet many would justify it if the person on trial had caused them harm. As Martin Luther King Jr. observed, “True peace is not merely the absence of tension: it is the presence of justice.” This tension between law, morality and perception of justice highlights the enduring difficulty in determining if killing can ever be seen as just. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not whether laws against war crimes exist, but whether they are capable of significantly restraining those who wield power.
This tension between law, morality and perception of justice highlights the enduring difficulty in determining if killing can ever be seen as just.
Reducing mindless killing can be achieved by clarifying responsibility and strengthening legal oversight at every level. When individuals are held accountable for their actions, the moral weight of taking a life becomes harder to ignore. Critics may argue that diffusing responsibility protects personnel or increases efficiency, but it can also risk normalising violence and desensitising people to human suffering.
Despite the foundations laid by Nuremberg and the UN, laws governing warfare often remain behind the reality of modern conflicts, leaving accountability incomplete and justice inconsistent. If justice solely depends on victory rather than conduct, it ceases to function as justice at all. Implementing clearer legal frameworks and ethical standards can help ensure that lethal actions are treated with the seriousness they deserve, rather than becoming routine or impersonal. For further consideration, readers may wish to explore the Nuremberg Trial judgments alongside ongoing debates on the regulation of remote and autonomous warfare.
