EU

Macedonia’s Name Debate Comes to an End

A 27-year dispute has been put to rest in Europe after a name deal was sealed between Athens and Skopje. The Greek parliament has rejected Macedonia’s name for decades since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Following the name deal in January, Greece’s neighbour will now add ‘North’ to its title, taking on the new name of the Republic of North Macedonia.

The change of name holds a crucial importance to both sides in the debate, predominantly due to the fact that Greece, which is a member of both NATO and the European Union, has been restricting Macedonia’s membership into NATO and the beginning of an accession talk with the EU until the dispute was to be resolved. Thus, both countries have been under pressure to resolve the disagreement, as the further integration of Balkan countries into the EU and NATO is deemed an important factor in proving the stability of the region. Due to the recent deal, the newly named Republic of North Macedonia can now pursue its application.

The change of name holds a crucial importance to both sides in the debate

Greek indignation towards the Republic of North Macedonia’s previous name, the Republic of Macedonia, is due to what they believe to be historical appropriation. The Greeks, and particularly right-wing nationalist politicians, have long been claiming the name Macedonia as a piece of cultural heritage. Many believe that only the northern Greek region of Macedonia, site of the ancient kingdom of Macedon and the Ancient Macedonians, is truly entitled to claim the name as its own. They argue that, southern Slavs arrived 1000 years after that Kingdom, therefore, lacking any relation to ancient Macedonia or its Greek culture. The debate has hence been a particularly emotional subject for those in the capital of the Greek region of Macedonia, Thessaloniki.

The belief that Macedonia is unfairly appropriating Hellenic history was only exacerbated by the erection of a Statue of Alexander the Great, which Greece condemned as ‘provocative’ and claimed Alexander as exclusively part of their Hellenic Heritage. Greece used the issue to justify further blocking Macedonia’s bid to join the international communities of NATO and the EU. This statue, along with others, were part of a one billion-dollar public building programme that had been undertaken by the previous nationalist government and, subsequently, criticised by Zoran Zaev.

The election of pro-EU Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in 2017 has sped up and pushed forwards the issue towards a resolution; near to the beginning of the debate in June 2018 he described the negotiations as a chance for the countries to become ‘partners and allies.’ Following this, an agreement was reached the very same month to rename the country the Republic of North Macedonia. However, there has been a struggle to carry this through due to the continuance of domestic opposition faced by both prime ministers, especially from nationalist parties.

Local resistance in, what is now known as North Macedonia, had been fierce

Local resistance in, what is now known as North Macedonia, had been fierce. The fear exists among some of the population that the new deal represented a foreign power, Greece, attempting to claim Macedonian territory and, thus, many despised the Greek exercise of control and their restriction of access to the international community.

Resistance was not the only factor that slowed down the name change of Macedonia. The referendum for this deal which was held in September, although boasting a 94% success of backing for the deal, was ruled invalid because not enough of the electorate turned out.

The deal has since been ratified by the Macedonian parliament on January 11^th, and Greek MPs were required to vote on agreement on January 25^th, resulting in a success. Although this wasn’t without struggle; Prime Minister Alex Tsipras of Greece has faced opposition from his right-wing coalition partners Independent Greeks who were against the deal and, thus, departed. This prompted a vote of confidence in Tsipras in mid-January, which he survived.

NATO and the EU have since celebrated Greece’s ratification of the Prespes Agreement which recognises its neighbour as North Macedonia. In order to proceed with applications for these international communities, North Macedonia must convene a committee to review its monuments and public buildings. They are required to take appropriate ‘corrective action’, according to the agreement of any historical appropriation – essentially, Alexander the Great must come down. Furthermore, historic, archaeological and educational matters must be revised by the Joint Inter-Disciplinary Committee of Experts in school textbooks, maps and teaching guides, to get rid of any incorrect claims of history and allusions to Ancient Macedon. Essentially, the next generation of North Macedonia is having its identity wholly redesigned by this deal, which has seen a decades long dispute come to an end.

Never Gonna Give EU Up

EVERY time that I think I’m over Brexit, I realise that I’m really, *really* not. It’s been over two years: I’m still deeply angry. I’m angry that politicians sold false promises for their own political gain (and that the British people fell for them), I’m angry that Brexit deal negotiations have devolved into utter shambles. But more than anything, I’m angry at how bloody unfair Brexit will be for our generation, especially when so few of us voted for it in the first place. It leaves a taste in my mouth so bitter that all the “adequate food” in the world couldn’t get rid of it.

But I know it’s not just me. Other people are angry too. 700,000 angry people in fact felt strongly enough to take to the streets in the People’s Vote march, and fight for a second referendum (never mind the 48% that never wanted to leave in the first place). The march was part of the wider People’s Vote movement, which has particularly sought to mobilise the support of students and young voters in recent months. But is this movement useful? Or is it just remoaners at their bitter worst?

The selection of this demographic to spearhead the campaign should come as no surprise. Of the voters that went to the ballot box in 2016, 73% of under 24-year-olds and 85% of students voted to remain in the EU. And this excludes anyone currently under the age of 20, who didn’t get a say at all in the matter.

The cruel irony, as Chuka Ummuna explained during the Students for A People’s Vote Roadshow here at the University of Exeter earlier this month, is that Brexit will “impact on you more than any other group”. Speaking of the movement, he appealed to his audience that “if we can’t get you involved in this campaign, we may as well pack up and go home”. This does raise an important point- ultimately if our generation doesn’t fight for a People’s Vote, then who will? So perhaps it’s understandable that young people are angry. Even so, is the People’s Vote movement justified in its demands? In my opinion, yes, it is.

What needs to be understood is that a people’s vote is not a second EU referendum. The crux of the question we’re facing has changed immeasurably over the past two years. We are no longer asking ‘shall we exit the EU’, but rather ‘how shall we manage leaving the EU’. Another referendum would not be a gratuitous exercise for remainers, but a necessary act of democracy to reach a consensus pertaining to a different question. And secondly, we cannot overlook the gravity of the matter. Britain is divided on quite a few subjects at the moment, but I think there are two things that have become unanimously clear over the last two years:

1) The Great British Bake Off is just not as good now that it’s on Channel 4, and 2) Brexit will affect every area of politics, and every aspect of our lives. It is the biggest issue to affect this country since the Second World War (Brexit that is, not Great British Bake Off). This is an exceptional matter. And unlike a general election, the end product will be entirely irreversible. Any Brexit strategy therefore demands a clear and strong mandate.

This is what protesters are taking to the streets for – to get their voices heard.

Furthermore, the People’s Vote campaign is serving a broader purpose amongst our generation, beyond its mission, and regardless of whether it ultimately achieves its demands. Many young people are angry. It is easy for anger to turn to political disillusion and apathy. And yet the movement is rechannelling that energy into productive political engagement, and right now, I think that is incredibly important.

So perhaps that’s something: a scrap of hope that can be salvaged from what otherwise seems a bleak political landscape to many. Who can say if the movement will be successful in initiating a vote on the final terms of Brexit? After all, the British government hardly has a strong track-record for being swayed by mass protest, or for listening to the voices of younger generations in this country. But the only certainty in British politics since the referendum has been its unpredictability.

Brexit, Northern Ireland & the DUP

Perhaps the most exhausted quotation in modern poetry is W.B Yeats: “Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold, mere anarchy is loosed upon the land”. It begins Patrick Cockburn’s book Chaos & the Caliphate. It is woven throughout Thomas Pynchon’s epic Gravity’s Rainbow, and has served title for books on madness to collections of wildlife photography. Never the less, there is always a temptation to reference ‘The Second Coming’ when talk turns to Northern Ireland and the border. Yeats grew up between London and County Sligo, now in the Republic, and perhaps five miles from Lough Melvin, which lies prostrate along the border. It – like the other counties that form border country and Ulster itself – was rocked in the sectarian turbulence of the last century, known as the Troubles.

Violence flared between Britain and the Irish nationalists during Yeats’ lifetime, culminating in the Easter Uprising of 1916. But the Troubles refer to an era of violence named the ‘long war’ by the IRA, which began in 1968 with a Catholic Civil Rights March, and ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. During this period, Britain suspended the Northern Irish assembly and imposed direct rule in an attempt to restore order between the predominantly Catholic nationalists, and the Protestant Unionists. The result was a low-level civil-war pockmarked by bombings and disappearances. For many, British Army checkpoints, particularly along the border, became a metonym for life during the Troubles.

A Canada style relationship with Europe – as is now being muted by the government – simply falls short

Asked recently by a BBC reporter whether concerns about a solid frontier returning to Ireland were not just part of ‘Project Fear’, as some have claimed, a bus driver who makes his living crossing the border replied, “they’ve never lived in Ireland with three check points to go through between North and South”. An end to frictionless trade with the EU is setting off claxons in factories throughout Britain. Car manufactures such as Ford and Toyota have made it clear that unimpeded access to the EU is what makes the UK such an appealing place to invest. A Canada style relationship with Europe – as is now being muted by the government – simply falls short.

Despite the vivid illustrations of ‘global Britain’ painted by the Leave Campaign, the point that long distance trade is cumbersome when compared with trade between neighbours, in a single market, is now being made in stark terms by business leaders. In Ireland, the threat to commerce has a human face. Small businesses – like the aforementioned bus company – depend on easy access to North and South for survival. The cultural implications of checkpoints once again squatting on roads throughout the hills of Donegal, Cavan and Armagh are also consequential.

Although crossing the border by road was sometimes difficult, it was not until the 1970s when systematic efforts were made to strangle transit by the British authorities. Craters were dug in roads and bridges were blown up. Checkpoints, suspicion, and scrutiny became the burden of the local people whose lives transcended the frontier. Few are suggesting that when the border of the Republic becomes Europe’s northwestern boundary, violence will erupt once more. Yet catholic and protestant schoolchildren cross every day, mingling with one another. In a study conducted by Queen Mary’s in Belfast, 93% of ex-pupils from integrated schools said that it had increased their respect for diversity, that being ‘catholic, protestant or other’.

Any hindrance to integration is likely to stunt a germinating frond of the peace process. the DUP recognize this. Despite its euroscepticism, the party propping up the increasingly saggy Conservative government is starting to look like a bulwark against Brexit. The EU is intent on a backup-plan that would establish a sea border between the mainland and Northern Ireland. The DUP will not tolerate any deal which sees Northern Ireland and Britain treated differently. Having fought a 30-year war against unification with the Republic, it is hardly surprising that they find the idea of a border between themselves and Britain repugnant.

In Ireland, the threat to commerce has a human face

Hopes of a breakthrough revived briefly when Minister for Brexit Dominic Raab made an unscheduled visit to Brussels, but perhaps due to its impromptu nature, the meeting only lasted an hour. Following this, government sources are saying that negotiations have hit a “real problem”, and EU negotiators are saying a no-deal scenario is increasingly likely. On hearing that the EU wanted plans for a sea border drawn up in case more desirable proposals were not ready in time, the DUP’s Brexit spokesman said that no-deal is now “probably inevitable”. If there is not a deal on the table when the clocks strike thirteen, because the Conservative Party was so desperate to stay in power that they leant on the DUP, then Faust himself would be proud.

Despite this, and the increasingly suggestive language like ‘open ended backstop’, that is creeping into the lexicon, there does appear to be genuine desire to resolve the border issue. As of the EU summit in Brussels, Britain’s transition period is set to be extended, potentially until 2021, as the search for closure continues. This might fly with Europe, but Theresa May will have a hard time selling this to the leave wing of her party. With Raab trying to make Parliament’s final vote either for the government plan, or for no-deal, the Prime Minister’s position is becoming precarious.

The New Labour government of 1997 made the two greatest contributions to European peace and security that this country has made since the Second World War: The reversal of Milosevic’s Serbia in defense of the Kosovo Albanians, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. with the election of Milorad Dodik in Bosnia, Serbo-fascism is once again threatening to cut apart the Balkans along sectarian lines. The danger in Northern Ireland is not so immediate, but few predicted the two deadliest years of the Troubles, culminating in the collapse of Stormont, would arise from a civil rights march. Peace in Northern Ireland is only 20-years old. We must not take it for granted.

Stuck on Mount Brexit

Theresa May likes her walking holidays. She reportedly decided to call last year’s general election on one such venture in Snowdonia. She may not have visited her other favourite (the Swiss Alps) this year because it seems as though she is there already- climbing a huge mountain, with little grip, and rather a big crevasse on the other side.

The legacy that any new Prime Minister inherits from their predecessor has a huge bearing on how they will ultimately be remembered. The mess May has inherited has few parallels – the country is still reeling from the effects of the financial crisis, social divisions are deep and we face the biggest administrative task since the war to boot.

The mess May has inherited has few parallels

The promises made by Vote Leave, which she chose to make her own, are the most toxic legacy of them all. Vote Leave and the Conservative Party have promised an inconsistent triad of policies – leave the single market, leave the customs union and avoid additional physical infrastructure on the Irish border or a border in the Irish Sea. This is the root of all the mayhem we have seen in recent weeks.

The Chequers proposals are an attempt to get out of this jam. For now, the illusion that all three promises can be kept is being maintained through the complicated ‘facilitated customs agreement’, under which the UK would collect EU tariffs and then reallocate the money back to Brussels – but the assumption across Westminster is that those plans will get the boot from Brussels and that some form of customs union will be agreed.

The explosive reaction to the Chequers plan, and the fact that hindsight is 20:20, means many of the Prime Minister’s previous decisions suddenly make some sense. The desire to avoid or delay the day of reckoning with backbenchers who think the inconsistent triad can be upheld is the story of the past two years – from the attempt to stop parliament having any say over the Brexit process, to the decision to call a snap general election and the endless attempts to fudge the issue and kick the can down the road in its aftermath.

Theresa May’s Cabinet ahead of talks at Chequers

The reckoning has now arrived. David Davis and Boris Johnson’s resignations suggest that the Tories are now irrevocably split; between former Remainers who broadly welcome the Chequers proposals, Brexiteers who say we just have to leave and worry about the future relationship later, and Brexiteers who are prepared to sink Mrs May’s proposals. The fact that neither Davis, Johnson nor Eurosceptic backbenchers can come up with their own workable proposals is almost beside the point. The Tories’ civil war over Europe, which has been rumbling on since Margret Thatcher’s day, may now be decisively won by one side or the other.

There’s a chance that the chaos and splits at the top could lead to May giving fewer concessions to Brussels. The mood music from the Commission in the immediate aftermath of Chequers was cautious optimism, accompanied by a clear message that many of the proposals may prove difficult to implement. Since the resignations, Brussels has gone into submarine mode – saying as little as possible to ensure May isn’t toppled. Since there is so little time left for negotiations, the EU’s main focus is secure a transition period with a ‘backstop’ solution for the Irish border, avoid no deal and push the rest of the detail into the transition period.

And when this is all, hopefully, wrapped up and the struggling PM has finally reached the summit, she has to look over the other side. It’s not pretty. Indeed, there are very few ways that she can get down unscathed and secure a safe landing.

The mood music from the Commission in the immediate aftermath of Chequers was cautious optimism

The reason for this lies in the most serious mistake Theresa May has made as Prime Minister – and it has nothing to do the Brexit talks or the calling of the general election. Since the crash, no party has been in the sweet spot of being trusted to manage the economy effectively and deliver a more compassionate society, and this explains why no single party has won a comfortable majority in parliament since 2005. Before the election, the Tories clocked up 20 point poll leads because voters largely believed that May was a very different type of Tory, which was crystallised by her rhetoric about ‘burning injustices’. When given the chance to put the flesh on some bones of this in an election manifesto, we instead got the dementia tax, fox hunting and proposals to take away free school lunches rather than anything that was positive.

With the onset of a hung parliament, it has become clear that any Brexit option would be extremely difficult to get through parliament. No option is supported by a majority of MPs, and any deal looks doomed even though, legally, the only alternative to leaving with a deal is to have no deal. Labour is guaranteed to whip its MPs to vote against whatever is proposed with the hope that it would trigger a general election, while it looks like enough Tory backbenchers are so ideologically opposed to the Chequers plan that they would be willing to risk an election. Whatever May brings back is extremely likely to be voted down. This could trigger a second referendum, an election, a frantic new round of negotiations, a fudge which pushes the substantive issues into the transition or no deal – but as this is Brexit, a fudge is most likely.

Fasten your belts because this whole thing will just go on, and on, and on. The tragedy is not that our GDP will be a bit smaller and our voice on the international stage will be slightly quieter, but that the real issues facing Britain will continue to be overlooked.

Germany’s Migration Crisis: The Policy Which Nearly Ended the Coalition

In 2015, the European Union faced rising figures of people seeking refuge in Europe in an attempt to escape war, poverty and persecution. Images and accounts of families and children fleeing their homes in cramped and dangerous conditions across the Mediterranean put an increasing amount of pressure on governments and the EU to act fast in an unprecedented dilemma.

At this point, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a decision dubbed as the biggest gamble of her career in order to prevent what she described as a “humanitarian crisis”.

After the Hungarian government closed the main railway stations in Budapest in a move to stop asylum seekers boarding trains to western Europe, Merkel hastily formed a plan with the Austrian government resulting in the refugees boarding trains to Munich a few hours later.

For a brief moment, Germany basked in its new worldwide image as the humanitarian heart of Europe. Yet, as former environment minister Norbert Röttgen explained, “collectively, Germany underestimated the longer-term implications and consequences” of this move.

For a brief moment, Germany basked in its new worldwide image as the humanitarian heart of Europe

Germany’s invitation was putting strain on the rest of Europe. Repeated requests for a quota to evenly distribute migrants across the EU were ignored. Gradually, Merkel’s approval ratings dropped, as did hope in her new policy.

By the end of 2015, the situation had turned sour with the rise of the right-wing Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) and news of sexual assaults carried out by non-native Germans on New Year’s Eve in Cologne. The run up to the September 2017 German election was met with an increased support for the AfD who eventually polled as the third party with 12.6% of votes, meaning the Eurosceptic AfD became Germany’s first far-right party to win parliament seats in nearly six decades.

Yet the election’s outcome proved to be something of a double-edged sword. Not only did it cement a rise in support for the right-wing, but Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) failed to gain the necessary 50% of seats, which led to a gruelling seven months of negotiations in an attempt to form a coalition. Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, negotiations of a different kind were taking place as the government tried to form a Brexit deal whilst members of Theresa May’s cabinet resigned in quick succession.

Signing the coalition contract: (from left to right) Olaf Scholz, Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer

Eventually, however, the conservative CDU reached a deal with the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). The CDU-CSU coalition has proved to be a strong partnership in the past, yet this summer saw a disagreement over migration policy nearly lead to its breakdown.

Familiar images and headlines surfaced of migrant rescue boats across the Mediterranean struggling to reach European ports without being turned away. The recent example of the Aquarius reaching Valencia after Malta and Italy refused to allow it to dock added a sense of wishful hindsight to Merkel’s previous requests for even migrant quotas throughout Europe.

Part of Merkel’s determination to uphold an EU-wide deal caused tensions with one of her closest allies. CSU leader Horst Seehofer maintained German police should be able to turn away migrants at the Bavarian border if they had sought asylum elsewhere, and following unsuccessful talks with his coalition leader Mrs Merkel, he then offered to resign as party leader and interior minister if a deal was not found within the EU, which allowed Germany to have some of its own terms to handle migrant numbers. Undoubtedly, this would have threatened to end the coalition altogether.

After complaining that a meeting with Merkel had been a “conversation with no effect” as they tried to discuss a new EU deal on migration, a crisis-point meeting in the early hours of the following day led to a breakthrough in compromise.

the election’s outcome proved to be something of a double-edged sword

General secretaries of both parties later announced that Germany would develop transit centres where asylum seekers already registered in another European Union country would be processed before being returned to that country, where possible – something which Greece and Spain agreed to in Brussels during crux talks. If that is not able to happen, both parties agreed the asylum seekers would be sent back across the border to Austria. Whilst it may not fully adhere to the EU-wide deal Merkel had hoped for, she reasoned that it kept in line with its “spirit of partnership”, and confirmed that Seehofer would be staying on in his positions.

Over the same weekend, Europe’s leaders had met in Brussels and agreed it was best to deal with the issue collectively, although the vague wording of the agreement meant participating nations can be involved on a voluntary basis, fuelling the internal debate in Germany.

Ultimately, whilst this breakthrough could be viewed as good news for the coalition, it does mean that both Merkel and Seehofer faced defeat in part on both their ideal plans for the policy and could lead to more scepticism in the Germans’ view of their chancellor, but time will tell. Seehofer himself hit back when he withdrew his threat to resign, claiming that he “wouldn’t be thrown out by the woman he’d put in power” – and for now at least, that appears to be true.

Boris Johnson’s Charm Offensive of Latin America

The Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, has returned from his five-day Latin American tour of Peru, Argentina and Chile that was conducted from the 19th to 23rd May.

The tour gave Prime Minister Theresa May some much needed breathing space to attempt to affirm her government’s position regarding what form the UK’s exit from the European Union will take, especially as the Cabinet is still in a state of paralysis over what Britain’s relationship with the customs union will be once the transitional period ends in December 2020.

But also, the trip was an opportunity for Johnson to revive and reinvigorate the beginnings of new UK trading relationships with Latin America. This is because if the Government implements its promise to the customs union, she will be able to strike up her own free trade deals with other sovereign states.

Johnson’s tour started in Peru where he visited the Amazon and discussed environmental issues with President Martín Vizcarra. Johnson’s travels involved launching a UK-funded solar energy project to provide energy for a school located in the Amazon, and the Foreign Secretary also affirmed the continued technical assistance the UK would be providing for the Pan American and ParaPan American Games scheduled to be held in Lima in 2019.

Also, during his trip, Boris found the time to feed some manatees, pet a baby monkey and a sloth, finishing off by dancing with a local schoolteacher. Johnson seemed to enjoy his visit, historically being the first foreign secretary to visit the country for fifty years.

The second phase of Johnson’s trip involved visiting Argentina, where he met with Foreign Minister Jorge Faurie and other government ministers to lay a wreath at the “Monument to the Fallen” to honour those who had died on both sides, British and Argentine, as a result of the Falklands War of 1982.

the Cabinet is still in a state of paralysis over what Britain’s relationship with the customs union will be once the transitional period ends in December 2020

On the 22nd May, Johnson at a press conference with Faurie commented on the continued collaboration that was occurring between the two nations. Johnson talked about how Argentine and British policy was similar in terms of a desire to establish an “intelligent reinsertion” back into the international sphere as the two countries adopt a globalist attitude towards free-trade.

Boris was pleased to exclaim that the “British people are already the second biggest consumers of Argentine wine… and that is before we have begun the free-trade deal that we hope to achieve together”.

Naturally, there was sensitivity regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, but both ministers were adamant that this disagreement would not get in the way of the commercial interests of the two nations. Before Boris left, he had meetings with President Mauricio Macri and praised the economic strategy of the administration.

The third leg of the Foreign Secretary’s whistle-stop tour of Latin America involved visiting Chile on the 23rd May where Johnson discussed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Ampuero, the aspirations of the UK to establish greater ties with the trading bloc of Mercosur and to develop a closer relationship with the Pacific Alliance.

Boris Johnson’s five-day trip of Latin America was portrayed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be one of optimism

Both ministers found common ground concerning the importance of increasing bilateral trade between the two nations, especially as Chile is the UK’s third largest export market in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil.

Regarding global issues, Chile and the UK both condemned the behaviour of Nicolás Maduro, President of Venezuela, regarding the circumstances of his re-election and expressed concern regarding the political dissolution of the Venezuelan people under his governance.

The Foreign Secretary also stood side-by-side with President Sebastián Piñera vis-à-vis the need to strengthen the international community’s commitment to the rule of law and its condemnation of the Assad regime in Syria’s recent use of chemical weapons in Douma in April.

Boris Johnson’s five-day trip of Latin America was portrayed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be one of optimism as the Foreign Secretary promoted the autonomy that Britain will have once she leaves the single market and the customs union, being able to negotiate her own bespoke trade deals.

Johnson seemed confident that once Britain leaves the restrictions of the EU she will be able to “[take] back control of [her] tariff schedules” enabling Britain to engage in more global trade due to being unhindered by the self-interest of individual member states of the EU27 and the European Commission.

However, this optimism for a truly “global Britain” jars with the reality that Argentina, part of Mercosur, has been attempting since 2000 to negotiate a trade deal with the EU, and the free-trading nations of Chile, Peru and Argentina will negotiate hard if future trade negotiations are to take place with the UK.

This is especially true since, currently, the UK provides only around 1% of imports in Argentina, Peru and Chile, respectively; nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary, during the course of the tour, was confident that, for the economic prosperity of the region and the UK, this figure would increase post-Brexit and that mutual gains could be achieved between the UK and her Latin American partners.

Some Vague Utopia – A Brexit Update

Just before Christmas, Theresa May returned from Brussels a hero. In the space of a week she had seemingly salvaged a process that appeared on the brink of collapse, as the Democratic Unionist Party – her government’s only lifeline in the House of Commons – had refused to endorse the preliminary deal on the Irish border. It was no good, they argued, to erect what amounted to a border in the Irish Sea. British citizens in Northern Ireland would be free to travel across the border to the Republic and back, but would have to produce passports or similar means of identification if they wanted to enter the mainland UK. A slave to parliamentary arithmetic, the Prime Minister and her negotiating delegation were forced back to the drawing board – and, apparently, secured a breakthrough.

On 15 December, the European Union collectively agreed to allow the Brexit process to move onto phase two, comprising trade talks and the matter of the future relationship between Britain and the EU. This decision was backed by the Irish government and the DUP, who had seemingly found common ground in supporting the redrafted deal for the Irish border. The UK committed itself to ‘full regulatory alignment’ on matters of Ireland to enable a smooth transition, and that was that. Case closed. This saga played out in the press as a significant victory for Downing Street, and on the issue of progression, this was true. The UK had managed to bypass fears of an EU or Irish veto, and would progress to the next stage of talks. But the wider issue remains. The alleged solution is nothing more than the can being kicked down the road, to be dealt with properly at some unknown future juncture. That would be bad enough, leaving aside the undeniable fact that this issue must be revisited before the year is out. A settlement hasn’t even been shunted into the long grass, just weakly thrown a few steps in front of the current government.

the European Union collectively agreed to allow the Brexit process to move onto phase two

This is just one of many issues that plague the government. A depressing number of them are self-inflicted, for instance, the debacle concerning the ‘return’ to the old blue passport. The problem isn’t even to do with the reality that there is no EU directive demanding a change of passport colour, a move that originated from a deliberate decision by the British government. Opinions to the counter have been aggressively dismissed by Manfred Weber, the head of the conservative-leaning People’s faction in the European Parliament, as nothing more than a ‘scam.’ Whilst a switch to blue passports will certainly make a lot of people very happy indeed, these people will predominantly be of the age to remember the blue passports and the switch to burgundy in 1988. The move certainly does not endear the government to the legions of young people already disenchanted by the vote to leave the European Union. I have no emotional connection to a blue passport. In my lifetime, my passport has always given me visa-free access to a raft of countries across Europe, as well as the ability to live and work there. That is about to change, and it beggars belief that a government already bereft of support amongst young people – and in the wake of the snap election, haemorrhaging even more – would seek to alienate itself further from young voters.

The stability of the government also deserves some discussion. The Prime Minister’s position appears, at least on the surface, remarkably more stable than it did three months ago. It does not take long, however, to break through this façade. It takes just 15% of the parliamentary Conservative Party – since the snap election, this translates to forty-eight MPs – to force a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister. Whilst she may fight it and win, Margaret Thatcher did the same under different rules in late 1990, and we all know how that turned out. Last November, reports circulated that the number of Tory MPs who had submitted a letter of no confidence to the chairman of the backbench 1922 Committee had reached forty. In the time since I began writing this article, another story has erupted concerning how the chairman, Graham Brady, is reportedly ‘ashen-faced’ at the thought that only a handful more letters could topple Theresa May. Were the Prime Minister to be pushed from office, or jump before she is pushed, the government would be thrust into a time-consuming leadership contest at a pivotal time in the Brexit talks.

The Prime Minister’s position appears remarkably more stable than it did three months ago

There has reportedly been discussion of a ‘coronation’, whereby a single compromise candidate for leader would be rallied around and made Prime Minister just a few weeks after a resignation, as happened after the resignation of David Cameron. But this is difficult to imagine in practice. Boris Johnson, the Foreign Secretary, would surely not pass up an opportunity to run for high office again. There are plenty who would stand to oppose him. Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, is the favourite of those Conservatives who desire a ‘soft Brexit.’ Jeremy Hunt, David Davis, and Michael Gove stand ready as Brexiteer candidates for those who find the Foreign Secretary unpalatable. There is even the prospect of a candidate from the hard Remain wing of the Conservative Party, somebody like Nicky Morgan or Anna Soubry. The Prime Minister’s retention of office after the disaster of the snap election was arguably due to this plethora of candidates standing in the wings: a leadership contest in the midst of the Brexit process would be nothing short of chaotic and bloody for all involved. A full contest, involving ballots of MPs to cut the contenders down to two and a subsequent balloting of the full party membership to elect the leader, would take around three months. In arguably the most important year of the Brexit talks, this is three months the government can hardly afford to lose.

Once the necessary forty-eight letters of no confidence are received, the ball starts rolling. The signatories of these letters – and the number of letters that have been received – are completely confidential to everybody except the Chairman of the 1922 Committee. The letters themselves remain on the record unless they are withdrawn. The risk stands that the Prime Minister might fumble some small detail in the months ahead, compromise on an issue that offends a backbencher of any political stripe, and that would spell her downfall. Attempting to chart a path of inoffensive compromise is hardly a solution either. Just this week, Nick Boles and Nicholas Soames, two prominent Conservative MPs, have publicly attacked Downing Street for ‘mediocrity’ and a lack of clear direction and purpose. The negotiation of Brexit would be difficult enough for a strong Prime Minister with a landslide behind them. For Theresa May, leading a minority government with the constant threat of a leadership coup hanging over her, it is unfathomably more difficult. Suffice to say, the next year will be extremely stressful indeed for those in the upper echelons of government.

It is, of course, remarkable that the Prime Minister has made it this far in the wake of the election. In the days following, as furious Tory MPs rounded on the leadership and Grenfell Tower burned, it seemed she had just days left. In my last article, in September, it seemed it would be impossible for such a weakened Prime Minister to chart their way through the first phase of the Brexit talks. When October’s party conference proved a shambles, I was convinced her time was up. At Christmas, I was increasingly convinced that Theresa May would be able to stick around until 2019, and the end of the Brexit process, and yet here we are. The year ahead will be dominated by difficult political challenges. Not only does the government have to decide officially what sort of Brexit it wants – membership of the customs union? A clean break from Brussels? – but it also has to navigate what are likely to be poor local elections in the spring and a myriad of scandals and leadership rumblings we cannot even begin to predict now. All the while, the ever-present spectre of Ireland and the impending vote in the House of Commons on the final deal hang over proceedings. A change of Prime Minister or a general election are unlikely this year but, as the last few years have proved, stranger things have happened.

It is remarkable that the Prime Minister has made it this far in the wake of the election

As I conclude, I find myself returning to the title of this piece. There is certainly something apt about ‘Some Vague Utopia’, a phrase drawn from the poetry of Irish poet W. B. Yeats. The quote’s Irish roots are certainly important, as the issue of Ireland will make or break the Brexit talks, but the wider ramifications of the phrase are more interesting. In all likelihood, Britain will leave the European Union in just over a year’s time. In all likelihood, we will carve a new place in the global economy distinct from the EU, and with time British institutions and businesses will adjust, and life will go on as before. But nobody seems to know what this new place will look like.

It is shocking that the Cabinet only convened in December, nine months after the invoking of Article 50, to discuss what sort of Brexit we were actually heading for. With a preliminary Brexit deal needing to be settled by mid-autumn in order to allow time for the required votes of approval in the British and European Parliaments, we are still – chillingly – not sure about what such a deal will look like. Even the strident Brexiteers in the Cabinet, Johnson and Gove, appear unsure of what the end state of Brexit will look like, although they are convinced that it will be fantastic.

So, that is where the ship of state is heading. As the Prime Minister was fond of saying in her first few months in office, Britain is leaving the European Union. 2018 will be the year we find out exactly what that looks like.

How to ‘win’ elections and alienate people

The Prime Minister stands triumphant in the House of Commons, a majority larger than Margaret Thatcher’s stacked up behind her. The opposition benches are noticeably emptier. Over half of Labour MPs lost their seats in the Tory tsunami. The SNP collapsed as Scotland’s electoral map turned blue for the first time in decades. You can count the surviving Lib Dems on one hand. With the Prime Minister still remarkably popular, the government can finally claim a mandate for the hard Brexit endorsed by the public in June’s snap election.

Yeah, that didn’t happen. Things did not go to plan. A year ago, the government stood ready to launch itself into the Brexit talks, headed by a Prime Minister regarded by most as a capable and safe pair of hands. A year on, the government’s is focused on its very survival, with Theresa May’s credibility as absent as the majority she once presided over. You may remember an article I wrote back in May, outlining what to expect from the Brexit process. The general election result has thrown many of those points out of the window and complicated even more. There is a lot to pack into the next eighteen months.

‘if you want our trade, you’ll have to pay’

The Brexit talks have stalled. As Nick Robinson succinctly put it, the impasse can be simplified to a clash between the EU position of ‘if you want our trade, you’ll have to pay’ and that of the UK, which can be boiled down to ‘if you want our money, you’ll have to talk trade.’ There is an acceptance on both sides that the UK will have to pay a ‘divorce bill’, an amount intended to settle the UK’s financial obligations to the EU. The impasse exists because the UK is keen to move beyond this and talk about trade, and the EU is refusing to budge until the bill is settled. Rumour has it that the EU is demanding €100bn, with the British government hoping to reduce that to approximately €20-30bn. Theresa May has reportedly agreed to pay a sum of approximately €45bn, an amount that whilst far beneath EU demands will still prove controversial with hard-line Eurosceptics on the Tory backbenches.

This last point is especially important in light of the election. Far from having received a landslide endorsement from voters, Theresa May’s government now soldiers on without a majority, while facing a hostile House of Commons. It is at this point necessary to explain the types of Brexit, and why a hung parliament severely complicates matters for the Prime Minister.

Hard Brexit: an immediate end to British membership of the single market, the customs union, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

First on the list is a ‘hard Brexit’, the arrangement preferred by the Prime Minister and the official position of the British government. This option would result in the UK leaving the EU at the end of March 2019, with an immediate end to British membership of the single market, the customs union, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. This would satisfy the Leave campaign mantra of ‘Take Back Control’, but potentially do harm to an economy used to decades of EU free trade. Had the Conservatives been re-elected with a landslide, the government would have been free to ignore the naysayers and push through such a deal with little difficulty. The lack of a landslide complicates matters. Government rebels mean that there is no clear majority for a ‘hard Brexit’ after the election. The government, at the time of writing, is pushing on regardless.

Soft Brexit: an extended transition of up to four years where membership of the single market and customs union is maintained

Next up comes ‘soft Brexit’, an optimistically-titled alternative that would still result in Britain withdrawing from the EU in 2019, but with an extended transition of up to four years where membership of the single market and customs union is maintained. This would provide more time to prepare for a full British withdrawal, leaving the option open for single market membership to be continued indefinitely. This has been labelled a jobs-first Brexit, as it prioritises the economy over immigration control, and has won the support of the Labour Party and several government rebels. There are perhaps a dozen Tory MPs willing to vote against a ‘hard Brexit’ in order to ease the transition. With little chance of Britain remaining in the EU, this proposal remains the most acceptable face of Brexit with both politicians and the public. MPs are due to vote on a key piece of legislation, nicknamed the Great Repeal Bill, in the coming weeks. The scale of rebellion from Tory backbenchers, particularly by backing amendments endorsing a ‘soft Brexit’, will be an interesting sign of whether the government is going to have to abandon its current strategy and embrace consensus.

The differences in Brexit mean a lot more now. May promised to put the final deal to a vote in the House of Commons, daring MPs to either support her or send Britain off a cliff with no deal. Lacking a majority and in the knowledge that pro-EU government MPs are likely to rebel, the possibility of the deal being rejected must have crossed the Prime Minister’s mind. It might seem easier with the support of the DUP, officials of which have endorsed the government’s position on Brexit. Not so fast.

A necessary, if unpopular, consequence of Brexit must be the establishment of some form of a border.

In my last article, I briefly touched on the issue of the Irish border as being extremely complicated, due to a history of violence and sectarian tension. One area of consensus, however, is that the ability to travel freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic is a good thing, and should be maintained. This policy, the Common Travel Area, was drawn up in part to prevent border posts becoming targets for attacks during the Troubles and enshrined as part of the Good Friday Agreement. A necessary, if unpopular, consequence of Brexit must be the establishment of some form of a border. With no amendment to the invisible Irish border, European migrants could simply travel to the Republic and enter the UK without immigration checks, rendering the supposed ability to ‘take back control of our borders’ invalid. One proposal from the Irish government has been to install customs checks at ports and airports, controversially forcing Northern Irish citizens to produce passports to travel within their own country. The principle of an invisible border is key to virtually all parties in Northern Ireland, including the DUP. The same DUP who are now propping up the government. The same DUP who could turn everything upside down if the Irish border is deemed too integral an issue to compromise on. With the government refusing to acknowledge the political realities of a post-Brexit Irish border, this is an issue that could prove extremely troubling in the months ahead.

The negotiations have been underway for six months. What has proved remarkable – embarrassing might be a better word – is the apparent inability of the British delegation to compromise. It is time to face reality. The sun will still come up after Brexit, but there is no point playing up to the insistence that the EU needs us more than we need them. What the snail’s pace of negotiations have proved is that the time for fantasy and crowd-pleasing rhetoric is over. The time for hard graft and compromise has arrived, and there is no point pretending otherwise. A common refrain has been that other issues, particularly immigration, matter more than the economy. While there is some legitimacy to this claim, we cannot allow the roof to fall in simply so we have control over who comes into the house. Voters had the opportunity in June’s election to endorse the Prime Minister’s platform. They had the opportunity to give her the mandate to push through a ‘hard Brexit.’ They did not give her this. Parliament stands opposed to such an arrangement, and the spectre of MPs rejecting the deal outright hangs over the negotiations.

By thrusting the country into an unnecessary election, May nearly lost power, dynamited her own authority and hobbled the British delegation’s ability to negotiate freely.

The Prime Minister insisted prior to calling the election that what Britain needed most was stability, and for a year this was what she provided. By thrusting the country into an unnecessary election, however, May nearly lost power, dynamited her own authority and hobbled the British delegation’s ability to negotiate freely. One eye must always now be on the floor of the House of Commons, as any wrong move could thrust the government into an election they’d be on track to lose. With the Prime Minister’s credibility in tatters just a year after taking office, with her government reliant on a group of Northern Irish MPs that are almost certainly going to take offence at aspects of the deal, with her own Cabinet circling like vultures in preparation for a leadership bloodbath, the government is heading into the most testing period since the Second World War.

This is not a time to savage the reputation of any one individual at the detriment of the national interest. If the Prime Minister finds that her shot authority or ramshackle government is an impediment to negotiations, she should get out of the way.

The Brexit Election

Theresa May has a comical aversion to giving a straight answer. For a long time, her only public pronouncements on Brexit were slogans: ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and, when challenged on whether it would be a hard or soft Brexit, the particularly laughable ‘Red, White, and Blue Brexit’. In January, she gave the public its clearest look at her intentions for the Brexit deal. These were ‘as free as possible trade’, leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and control over immigration from the EU. These negotiating principles suggested that her plan is for a hard Brexit.

There is no fixed definition for hard Brexit and soft Brexit. Generally speaking, a soft Brexit would be staying as close as possible to the EU, remaining a member of the single market and losing complete control over immigration, while a hard Brexit would be leaving the single market and customs union, falling back on to World Trading Organisation (WTO) rules on trade and tariffs until a free trade deal can be negotiated. While a soft Brexit would be the least economically damaging, it would barely fulfil the result of the referendum – it would be leaving in name only, with Britain simply giving up any say over the direction of the EU. Conversely, a hard Brexit under WTO rules would cost exporters up to £6 billion a year in tariffs. Given that Britain’s former EU ambassador Sir Ivan Rogers has warned that negotiating a trade deal with Europe could take up to ten years, this would be hugely damaging to the economy. The prospect of a transition period has been raised, where Britain retains its position in the EU while the trade deal is negotiated. While this would minimise economic shock, this would leave Britain under the jurisdiction of the ECJ and with no control over immigration from the EU until it has truly left. The Prime Minister and Chancellor have signalled support for a transition period, so it is likely that Britain’s departure will take several years longer than expected.

‘it is likely that Britain’s departure will take several years longer than expected’

The Prime Minister explicitly made the election into a Brexit election. A vote for any Conservative candidate, she said, was a vote to empower her going in to the negotiations. Do you trust me and my team, she asked, or Jeremy Corbyn and his to take us out of the EU? This approach backfired spectacularly. A 20-point lead at the beginning of the election turned to dust as the Conservative Party lost its majority. Labour gained 30 seats. Theresa May did not secure majority; implicitly, then, the country seems to have rejected her plan for Brexit.

‘A 20-point lead at the beginning of the election turned to dust as the Conservative Party lost its majority’

Of course, it’s more complex than that. It was not just a Brexit election. Jeremy Corbyn campaigned on conventional issues like austerity, wages, and tuition fees. The UKIP vote was expected to go entirely back to the Conservatives, but was split evenly between them and Labour. The Lib Dems were expecting a resurgence that failed to materialise. This resulted in both of the main parties getting huge shares of the vote, the Conservatives at 42.3% (up 5.5% from the last election) and Labour at 40.0% (up 9.6%). While May delivered two million more votes than David Cameron in 2015, and won more votes than Tony Blair ever did, it was not enough. In Britain, seats are what matter.

Image: Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader./Wikipedia.org

So this election, meant to give May the authority to negotiate our departure from the EU, has instead thrown everything up in the air. She was widely expected to replace Phillip Hammond, the pro-remain, pro-single market Chancellor in a Cabinet reshuffle after the election. She now lacks the ability to move him, and he has become empowered to argue against May’s principles for negotiating, hinting in a speech after the election that we will pursue a softer Brexit than previously thought. The Conservative star of the election, Ruth Davidson of the Scottish Conservatives, has signalled her support for staying in the single market, and has suggested that the Conservatives should consult with other parties as it negotiates Brexit. The lack of a majority will also embolden pro-single market backbenchers to speak out, aware that a hard Brexit platform has lost the party seats and that May’s authority has vanished.

It is obviously very difficult to make predictions on the final outcome of Britain’s exit from the EU. We can, though, use the results of the first day of negotiations as a suggestion of what’s to come. David Davis, Britain’s negotiator, has suggested that the ‘row of the summer’ will be about the timeline of the talks. Davis wanted to begin trade talks in tandem with divorce talks, while the EU said that the divorce must be negotiated first before talks on trade can begin. On the first day, Davis accepted the EU timeline for events. For all the election bravado of no deal being better than a bad deal, it is clear that Davis is willing to compromise to make the talks work. On the EU side, the negotiator Michel Barnier has said that he is not willing to make concessions, but is willing to strike a fair deal. There have also been suggestions that after the German election more positive offers will be made, with the UK able to stay a member of the single market while having control over immigration for five years. Ultimately, though, the EU will not want to give Britain a better deal outside the bloc than in it, because this would encourage others to leave. It is plausible, then, instead of a clean break in 2019, the final deal will be a compromise, taking place anywhere up to a decade from now. If anything is certain, it is that the election called to strengthen May’s negotiating hand has done the opposite, and we will now certainly have a softer Brexit than she previously intended.

Brexit negotiations – where are they going with this?

Brexit means … what, exactly?

The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union.

That much is clear, assuming the stars don’t align and send a bewildered Tim Farron to Downing Street in June’s general election. What isn’t clear, however, is what comes next: what the next two years of Brexit talks will look like, and what the aftermath to such talks will be. These will be difficult issues to address, given how both sides are playing their cards close to their chests. This comes as no surprise. As with any divorce, neither side wants to emerge from the process at a disadvantage, nor having lost face. A relationship that was previously just uneasy has now become one dominated by second-guessing and bravado, ahead of talks set to begin later this year. Not least is the fact that the upcoming UK general election was called, as Theresa May freely admitted, to strengthen her hand in the Brexit negotiations.

a starting pistol being fired on the Brexit process, giving the negotiating teams just two years to hammer out a deal

Article 50 of the EU Treaty was invoked by the Prime Minister on 29 March, formally notifying the EU that Britain is heading for the door. It constitutes a starting pistol being fired on the Brexit process, giving the negotiating teams just two years to hammer out a deal. It is important at this point, however, to note that even the timetable itself is up for discussion.

the talks may be effectively delayed until after important elections in France and Germany to ensure the so-called ‘twin engine’ of the EU has stable leadership

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, indicated in December 2016 that the negotiation period cannot span the entire two years due to the need to review and ratify the final agreement, and should take place between March 2017 and October 2018. While this is the goal of the British government – described as “absolutely ample” time by Boris Johnson – it is an unlikely possibility that everything will be agreed by then. Suffice to say, Barnier’s timetable has been complicated by the calling of a UK general election for 8 June, and EU officials now expect the official negotiating process to begin afterwards. Even prior to this, there had been suggestions that the talks may be effectively delayed until after important elections in France and Germany to ensure the so-called ‘twin engine’ of the EU has stable leadership. The Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, has gone as far as to state that it will be ‘impossible’ for a deal to be drawn up completely by the time Britain formally leaves. This has led to speculation concerning the possibility of a transitional arrangement that would come into effect on Brexit Day in 2019, giving the negotiating teams more time to discuss the details without a looming deadline. Whether these further negotiations would last another two, five, or ten years is also up for debate.

the principle of freedom of movement is incompatible with her desire to control immigration

It will be no simple task to decouple the British political and economic machine from that of Europe. The most contentious area of discussion will doubtlessly be a free trade agreement, one that the British government hopes mirrors current access to the single market as much as possible. This is necessary given Theresa May’s indication that Britain will withdraw from the single market, citing that the principle of freedom of movement is incompatible with her desire to control immigration. Hostility from EU officials to the prospect of a special deal for Britain, not least the warning from Angela Merkel that there could be ‘no cherry picking’ by British officials, reinforces the notion that this will prove an extremely complicated area of negotiation. This is the case even without considering the need to negotiate a new relationship regarding financial services, in particular links between the City of London – the financial hub of Europe – and European financial institutions. The Sword of Damocles hanging over these negotiations, and indeed one openly mused about by the Chancellor, Philip Hammond, is the implicit threat that Britain could transform itself into a tax haven on Europe’s doorstep should the final agreement not provide adequate protections for the British economy.

the possibility of using EU citizens resident in the UK as so-called ‘bargaining chips’ to bolster the UK’s negotiating position

There is, of course, a non-economic dimension to the Brexit talks. There has been significant concern about the possibility of using EU citizens resident in the UK as so-called ‘bargaining chips’ to bolster the UK’s negotiating position. This has been roundly condemned, although, as recently as in January the Home Office’s stance was that no assurances would be given until similar assurances were given for British citizens in EU countries. Concerns closer to home, for instance the Erasmus programme for university students, poses a further risk to existing residents. Whilst Steve Smith, Exeter’s Vice Chancellor, has reassured European students that there will be ‘no immediate changes’ to their status, and Universities Minister, Jo Johnson, pledged his support for efforts to retain Erasmus membership, there have been no solid assurances.

Britain will leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice

Areas of further contention include May’s uncompromising assertion that Britain will leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, a controversial proposal for a divorce bill with a proposed sum of €60m, and the sensitive issue of the Irish border. The latter in particular will have significant effects domestically. Current commitments under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement removed border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, although Brexit raises new issues given the paradox between an open section of UK-EU border and Britain regaining control of immigration policy. The Leave rallying cry of ‘Take Back Control’ of the borders, unofficially adopted by the May government, is rendered moot if European citizens can simply cross the Irish border freely and enter the UK without checks. The inability of unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland to negotiate a stable devolved executive since January only complicates matters further.

the risk remains that Britain will be made an example of in order to beat back Eurosceptic sentiment in the rest of the EU

Regardless of whatever the deal looks like, Britain will be formally leaving the European Union in the spring of 2019. There will be testing times ahead for both negotiating teams on a myriad of issues, and it can be assumed that EU officials want to dissuade the prospect of an Independence May: Resurgence taking place in any other member state. With elections to the European Parliament scheduled to take place just months after Brexit takes place, the risk remains that Britain will be made an example of in order to beat back Eurosceptic sentiment in the rest of the EU.

There is little for the rest of us to do but to sit back and watch as the Brexit freight train slowly rumbles towards us for the next two years.

Brace for impact, but do please put the kettle on.