Nick Greenwood

The Democratic Party presidential primaries

Sep 3, 2019 – by Nick Greenwood

The world has to wait until 3 November 2020 to see if Americans will elect Donald Trump to a second term, but his opponent is in the process of being chosen. The Democrats are yet to decide who they’ll rally behind, and with just five months to go until the first primary contests, candidates are jockeying for position. On 12 September, ten of the twenty remaining candidates will assemble in Houston for the third primary debate. Who is running? What’s at stake? What on earth is going on?

So far in the campaign there have been two series of debates, in June and July, with attending candidates needing to pass one of two criteria. Either their candidacy achieved 2% in four different polls accepted by the Democratic National Committee, be it nationally or in the first four contest states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina), or they pass a fundraising criterion: 130,000 unique donors, with at least four hundred donors per state in at least twenty states. To qualify for the Houston debate, you needed to satisfy bothcriteria. The winnowing of the field began, and only ten qualified.

With that in mind, let’s look at the debating candidates. There’s a former vice president (Joe Biden), five senators (Cory Booker, Kamala Harris, Amy Klobuchar, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren), a former congressman (Beto O’Rourke), a mayor (Pete Buttigieg), a former Cabinet secretary (Julián Castro), and a businessman (Andrew Yang).

It’s probably safe to say that one of these ten will be the Democratic nominee; in fact, it’s probably safe to say that outside of a miracle, there are only five real contenders: Biden, Buttigieg, Harris, Sanders, and Warren. The other five are, as less-kind pundits have suggested, running for the vice presidency or a Cabinet job. Biden is the undisputed front-runner, polling just shy of 30% nationally and ahead in the first contests. Sanders and Warren, the progressive firebrands, are fighting for second with around 16-17% each, and yet in recent weeks polling has shown Warren to be nipping at Biden’s heels in Iowa and New Hampshire. Harris and Buttigieg had surges in support earlier this year: Harris performed well in the first debate, and Buttigieg’s status as the first gay candidate for the presidency and, at 37, by far the youngest, gives him wider appeal. Both, however, lag behind at 5-8% nationally, performing only marginally better in early states.

Elizabeth Warren [Photo Credit: Gage Skidmore]

The early states are important, as they set the narrative. While Biden leads nationally, for example, early Warren victories would, as Politicorecently put it, set Warren’s ‘rock star’ appeal on a collision course with Biden, the ‘rock’ of the race. That’s why the debate on 12 September is so critical. It is not in Biden’s interests as the front-runner to attend; the debate gives other candidates a chance to shine, present their case, and potentially go viral. Harris’ humiliation of Biden over busing in June, or Sanders’ spirited defence of universal healthcare in July (memorably declaring that he knew how it would work because “[he] wrote the damn bill!”), went viral and boosted both campaigns. For candidates with lower name-recognition, the debates also provide an opportunity for the electorate and the news cycle to familiarise themselves with their candidacy.

The debates are an opportunity to reassess their impressions

It is also necessary to talk about the lower-tier five on the stage. It can’t be nice to put everything on the field and run for president, only for some postgrad on the other side of the world to label you ‘lower-tier’, but sometimes the truth hurts. In the latest DNC-approved national poll, Biden took 32%; Castro, also on stage, polled below 1%. To qualify for the debate ten, however, also raises points of expectation. It is remarkable that Andrew Yang stands on stage alongside other candidates. He is feasibly a fringe candidate, possessing no political experience and running entirely on the issue of a universal basic income. That he has qualified for what is likely to be the final ten is a great achievement. On the other side of the expectations game, you have Beto O’Rourke. The former congressman became a Democratic rock-star last autumn after running a spirited, if unsuccessful, bid to unseat Republican senator Ted Cruz in Texas. With poll numbers surging, he declared his candidacy soon after; a close second in Iowa polling in December, the latest polls show him under 1%. That he is underperforming is perhaps an understatement.

Democrat Contender: Andrew Yang [Photo credit: Gage Skidmore]

Yang and O’Rourke reinforce the importance of next month’s debate. For both it is an opportunity to, for a night at least, claim an equal platform with the frontrunners. For the audience, the debates are an opportunity to reassess their impressions. Biden’s reputation as a political titan, and his poll numbers, took a sizeable hit after poor performances in the last debates. Warren has the reverse case. Announcing her candidacy with relatively-low polling numbers and amidst a scandal about Native American heritage, her detailed policy proposals and strident defence of progressivism have given her second wings. Having stood on different stages during the June and July debates, all eyes are on how Biden and Warren interact in Houston.

If Beto O’Rourke scores a landslide win in Iowa on the back of inspirational debate performances, and Andrew Yang takes South Carolina after his UBI proposal surges in popularity, don’t say I didn’t warn you that debates can matter.

Just don’t put any money on it either.

Some Vague Utopia – A Brexit Update

Just before Christmas, Theresa May returned from Brussels a hero. In the space of a week she had seemingly salvaged a process that appeared on the brink of collapse, as the Democratic Unionist Party – her government’s only lifeline in the House of Commons – had refused to endorse the preliminary deal on the Irish border. It was no good, they argued, to erect what amounted to a border in the Irish Sea. British citizens in Northern Ireland would be free to travel across the border to the Republic and back, but would have to produce passports or similar means of identification if they wanted to enter the mainland UK. A slave to parliamentary arithmetic, the Prime Minister and her negotiating delegation were forced back to the drawing board – and, apparently, secured a breakthrough.

On 15 December, the European Union collectively agreed to allow the Brexit process to move onto phase two, comprising trade talks and the matter of the future relationship between Britain and the EU. This decision was backed by the Irish government and the DUP, who had seemingly found common ground in supporting the redrafted deal for the Irish border. The UK committed itself to ‘full regulatory alignment’ on matters of Ireland to enable a smooth transition, and that was that. Case closed. This saga played out in the press as a significant victory for Downing Street, and on the issue of progression, this was true. The UK had managed to bypass fears of an EU or Irish veto, and would progress to the next stage of talks. But the wider issue remains. The alleged solution is nothing more than the can being kicked down the road, to be dealt with properly at some unknown future juncture. That would be bad enough, leaving aside the undeniable fact that this issue must be revisited before the year is out. A settlement hasn’t even been shunted into the long grass, just weakly thrown a few steps in front of the current government.

the European Union collectively agreed to allow the Brexit process to move onto phase two

This is just one of many issues that plague the government. A depressing number of them are self-inflicted, for instance, the debacle concerning the ‘return’ to the old blue passport. The problem isn’t even to do with the reality that there is no EU directive demanding a change of passport colour, a move that originated from a deliberate decision by the British government. Opinions to the counter have been aggressively dismissed by Manfred Weber, the head of the conservative-leaning People’s faction in the European Parliament, as nothing more than a ‘scam.’ Whilst a switch to blue passports will certainly make a lot of people very happy indeed, these people will predominantly be of the age to remember the blue passports and the switch to burgundy in 1988. The move certainly does not endear the government to the legions of young people already disenchanted by the vote to leave the European Union. I have no emotional connection to a blue passport. In my lifetime, my passport has always given me visa-free access to a raft of countries across Europe, as well as the ability to live and work there. That is about to change, and it beggars belief that a government already bereft of support amongst young people – and in the wake of the snap election, haemorrhaging even more – would seek to alienate itself further from young voters.

The stability of the government also deserves some discussion. The Prime Minister’s position appears, at least on the surface, remarkably more stable than it did three months ago. It does not take long, however, to break through this façade. It takes just 15% of the parliamentary Conservative Party – since the snap election, this translates to forty-eight MPs – to force a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister. Whilst she may fight it and win, Margaret Thatcher did the same under different rules in late 1990, and we all know how that turned out. Last November, reports circulated that the number of Tory MPs who had submitted a letter of no confidence to the chairman of the backbench 1922 Committee had reached forty. In the time since I began writing this article, another story has erupted concerning how the chairman, Graham Brady, is reportedly ‘ashen-faced’ at the thought that only a handful more letters could topple Theresa May. Were the Prime Minister to be pushed from office, or jump before she is pushed, the government would be thrust into a time-consuming leadership contest at a pivotal time in the Brexit talks.

The Prime Minister’s position appears remarkably more stable than it did three months ago

There has reportedly been discussion of a ‘coronation’, whereby a single compromise candidate for leader would be rallied around and made Prime Minister just a few weeks after a resignation, as happened after the resignation of David Cameron. But this is difficult to imagine in practice. Boris Johnson, the Foreign Secretary, would surely not pass up an opportunity to run for high office again. There are plenty who would stand to oppose him. Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, is the favourite of those Conservatives who desire a ‘soft Brexit.’ Jeremy Hunt, David Davis, and Michael Gove stand ready as Brexiteer candidates for those who find the Foreign Secretary unpalatable. There is even the prospect of a candidate from the hard Remain wing of the Conservative Party, somebody like Nicky Morgan or Anna Soubry. The Prime Minister’s retention of office after the disaster of the snap election was arguably due to this plethora of candidates standing in the wings: a leadership contest in the midst of the Brexit process would be nothing short of chaotic and bloody for all involved. A full contest, involving ballots of MPs to cut the contenders down to two and a subsequent balloting of the full party membership to elect the leader, would take around three months. In arguably the most important year of the Brexit talks, this is three months the government can hardly afford to lose.

Once the necessary forty-eight letters of no confidence are received, the ball starts rolling. The signatories of these letters – and the number of letters that have been received – are completely confidential to everybody except the Chairman of the 1922 Committee. The letters themselves remain on the record unless they are withdrawn. The risk stands that the Prime Minister might fumble some small detail in the months ahead, compromise on an issue that offends a backbencher of any political stripe, and that would spell her downfall. Attempting to chart a path of inoffensive compromise is hardly a solution either. Just this week, Nick Boles and Nicholas Soames, two prominent Conservative MPs, have publicly attacked Downing Street for ‘mediocrity’ and a lack of clear direction and purpose. The negotiation of Brexit would be difficult enough for a strong Prime Minister with a landslide behind them. For Theresa May, leading a minority government with the constant threat of a leadership coup hanging over her, it is unfathomably more difficult. Suffice to say, the next year will be extremely stressful indeed for those in the upper echelons of government.

It is, of course, remarkable that the Prime Minister has made it this far in the wake of the election. In the days following, as furious Tory MPs rounded on the leadership and Grenfell Tower burned, it seemed she had just days left. In my last article, in September, it seemed it would be impossible for such a weakened Prime Minister to chart their way through the first phase of the Brexit talks. When October’s party conference proved a shambles, I was convinced her time was up. At Christmas, I was increasingly convinced that Theresa May would be able to stick around until 2019, and the end of the Brexit process, and yet here we are. The year ahead will be dominated by difficult political challenges. Not only does the government have to decide officially what sort of Brexit it wants – membership of the customs union? A clean break from Brussels? – but it also has to navigate what are likely to be poor local elections in the spring and a myriad of scandals and leadership rumblings we cannot even begin to predict now. All the while, the ever-present spectre of Ireland and the impending vote in the House of Commons on the final deal hang over proceedings. A change of Prime Minister or a general election are unlikely this year but, as the last few years have proved, stranger things have happened.

It is remarkable that the Prime Minister has made it this far in the wake of the election

As I conclude, I find myself returning to the title of this piece. There is certainly something apt about ‘Some Vague Utopia’, a phrase drawn from the poetry of Irish poet W. B. Yeats. The quote’s Irish roots are certainly important, as the issue of Ireland will make or break the Brexit talks, but the wider ramifications of the phrase are more interesting. In all likelihood, Britain will leave the European Union in just over a year’s time. In all likelihood, we will carve a new place in the global economy distinct from the EU, and with time British institutions and businesses will adjust, and life will go on as before. But nobody seems to know what this new place will look like.

It is shocking that the Cabinet only convened in December, nine months after the invoking of Article 50, to discuss what sort of Brexit we were actually heading for. With a preliminary Brexit deal needing to be settled by mid-autumn in order to allow time for the required votes of approval in the British and European Parliaments, we are still – chillingly – not sure about what such a deal will look like. Even the strident Brexiteers in the Cabinet, Johnson and Gove, appear unsure of what the end state of Brexit will look like, although they are convinced that it will be fantastic.

So, that is where the ship of state is heading. As the Prime Minister was fond of saying in her first few months in office, Britain is leaving the European Union. 2018 will be the year we find out exactly what that looks like.

How to ‘win’ elections and alienate people

The Prime Minister stands triumphant in the House of Commons, a majority larger than Margaret Thatcher’s stacked up behind her. The opposition benches are noticeably emptier. Over half of Labour MPs lost their seats in the Tory tsunami. The SNP collapsed as Scotland’s electoral map turned blue for the first time in decades. You can count the surviving Lib Dems on one hand. With the Prime Minister still remarkably popular, the government can finally claim a mandate for the hard Brexit endorsed by the public in June’s snap election.

Yeah, that didn’t happen. Things did not go to plan. A year ago, the government stood ready to launch itself into the Brexit talks, headed by a Prime Minister regarded by most as a capable and safe pair of hands. A year on, the government’s is focused on its very survival, with Theresa May’s credibility as absent as the majority she once presided over. You may remember an article I wrote back in May, outlining what to expect from the Brexit process. The general election result has thrown many of those points out of the window and complicated even more. There is a lot to pack into the next eighteen months.

‘if you want our trade, you’ll have to pay’

The Brexit talks have stalled. As Nick Robinson succinctly put it, the impasse can be simplified to a clash between the EU position of ‘if you want our trade, you’ll have to pay’ and that of the UK, which can be boiled down to ‘if you want our money, you’ll have to talk trade.’ There is an acceptance on both sides that the UK will have to pay a ‘divorce bill’, an amount intended to settle the UK’s financial obligations to the EU. The impasse exists because the UK is keen to move beyond this and talk about trade, and the EU is refusing to budge until the bill is settled. Rumour has it that the EU is demanding €100bn, with the British government hoping to reduce that to approximately €20-30bn. Theresa May has reportedly agreed to pay a sum of approximately €45bn, an amount that whilst far beneath EU demands will still prove controversial with hard-line Eurosceptics on the Tory backbenches.

This last point is especially important in light of the election. Far from having received a landslide endorsement from voters, Theresa May’s government now soldiers on without a majority, while facing a hostile House of Commons. It is at this point necessary to explain the types of Brexit, and why a hung parliament severely complicates matters for the Prime Minister.

Hard Brexit: an immediate end to British membership of the single market, the customs union, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

First on the list is a ‘hard Brexit’, the arrangement preferred by the Prime Minister and the official position of the British government. This option would result in the UK leaving the EU at the end of March 2019, with an immediate end to British membership of the single market, the customs union, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. This would satisfy the Leave campaign mantra of ‘Take Back Control’, but potentially do harm to an economy used to decades of EU free trade. Had the Conservatives been re-elected with a landslide, the government would have been free to ignore the naysayers and push through such a deal with little difficulty. The lack of a landslide complicates matters. Government rebels mean that there is no clear majority for a ‘hard Brexit’ after the election. The government, at the time of writing, is pushing on regardless.

Soft Brexit: an extended transition of up to four years where membership of the single market and customs union is maintained

Next up comes ‘soft Brexit’, an optimistically-titled alternative that would still result in Britain withdrawing from the EU in 2019, but with an extended transition of up to four years where membership of the single market and customs union is maintained. This would provide more time to prepare for a full British withdrawal, leaving the option open for single market membership to be continued indefinitely. This has been labelled a jobs-first Brexit, as it prioritises the economy over immigration control, and has won the support of the Labour Party and several government rebels. There are perhaps a dozen Tory MPs willing to vote against a ‘hard Brexit’ in order to ease the transition. With little chance of Britain remaining in the EU, this proposal remains the most acceptable face of Brexit with both politicians and the public. MPs are due to vote on a key piece of legislation, nicknamed the Great Repeal Bill, in the coming weeks. The scale of rebellion from Tory backbenchers, particularly by backing amendments endorsing a ‘soft Brexit’, will be an interesting sign of whether the government is going to have to abandon its current strategy and embrace consensus.

The differences in Brexit mean a lot more now. May promised to put the final deal to a vote in the House of Commons, daring MPs to either support her or send Britain off a cliff with no deal. Lacking a majority and in the knowledge that pro-EU government MPs are likely to rebel, the possibility of the deal being rejected must have crossed the Prime Minister’s mind. It might seem easier with the support of the DUP, officials of which have endorsed the government’s position on Brexit. Not so fast.

A necessary, if unpopular, consequence of Brexit must be the establishment of some form of a border.

In my last article, I briefly touched on the issue of the Irish border as being extremely complicated, due to a history of violence and sectarian tension. One area of consensus, however, is that the ability to travel freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic is a good thing, and should be maintained. This policy, the Common Travel Area, was drawn up in part to prevent border posts becoming targets for attacks during the Troubles and enshrined as part of the Good Friday Agreement. A necessary, if unpopular, consequence of Brexit must be the establishment of some form of a border. With no amendment to the invisible Irish border, European migrants could simply travel to the Republic and enter the UK without immigration checks, rendering the supposed ability to ‘take back control of our borders’ invalid. One proposal from the Irish government has been to install customs checks at ports and airports, controversially forcing Northern Irish citizens to produce passports to travel within their own country. The principle of an invisible border is key to virtually all parties in Northern Ireland, including the DUP. The same DUP who are now propping up the government. The same DUP who could turn everything upside down if the Irish border is deemed too integral an issue to compromise on. With the government refusing to acknowledge the political realities of a post-Brexit Irish border, this is an issue that could prove extremely troubling in the months ahead.

The negotiations have been underway for six months. What has proved remarkable – embarrassing might be a better word – is the apparent inability of the British delegation to compromise. It is time to face reality. The sun will still come up after Brexit, but there is no point playing up to the insistence that the EU needs us more than we need them. What the snail’s pace of negotiations have proved is that the time for fantasy and crowd-pleasing rhetoric is over. The time for hard graft and compromise has arrived, and there is no point pretending otherwise. A common refrain has been that other issues, particularly immigration, matter more than the economy. While there is some legitimacy to this claim, we cannot allow the roof to fall in simply so we have control over who comes into the house. Voters had the opportunity in June’s election to endorse the Prime Minister’s platform. They had the opportunity to give her the mandate to push through a ‘hard Brexit.’ They did not give her this. Parliament stands opposed to such an arrangement, and the spectre of MPs rejecting the deal outright hangs over the negotiations.

By thrusting the country into an unnecessary election, May nearly lost power, dynamited her own authority and hobbled the British delegation’s ability to negotiate freely.

The Prime Minister insisted prior to calling the election that what Britain needed most was stability, and for a year this was what she provided. By thrusting the country into an unnecessary election, however, May nearly lost power, dynamited her own authority and hobbled the British delegation’s ability to negotiate freely. One eye must always now be on the floor of the House of Commons, as any wrong move could thrust the government into an election they’d be on track to lose. With the Prime Minister’s credibility in tatters just a year after taking office, with her government reliant on a group of Northern Irish MPs that are almost certainly going to take offence at aspects of the deal, with her own Cabinet circling like vultures in preparation for a leadership bloodbath, the government is heading into the most testing period since the Second World War.

This is not a time to savage the reputation of any one individual at the detriment of the national interest. If the Prime Minister finds that her shot authority or ramshackle government is an impediment to negotiations, she should get out of the way.

Brexit negotiations – where are they going with this?

Brexit means … what, exactly?

The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union.

That much is clear, assuming the stars don’t align and send a bewildered Tim Farron to Downing Street in June’s general election. What isn’t clear, however, is what comes next: what the next two years of Brexit talks will look like, and what the aftermath to such talks will be. These will be difficult issues to address, given how both sides are playing their cards close to their chests. This comes as no surprise. As with any divorce, neither side wants to emerge from the process at a disadvantage, nor having lost face. A relationship that was previously just uneasy has now become one dominated by second-guessing and bravado, ahead of talks set to begin later this year. Not least is the fact that the upcoming UK general election was called, as Theresa May freely admitted, to strengthen her hand in the Brexit negotiations.

a starting pistol being fired on the Brexit process, giving the negotiating teams just two years to hammer out a deal

Article 50 of the EU Treaty was invoked by the Prime Minister on 29 March, formally notifying the EU that Britain is heading for the door. It constitutes a starting pistol being fired on the Brexit process, giving the negotiating teams just two years to hammer out a deal. It is important at this point, however, to note that even the timetable itself is up for discussion.

the talks may be effectively delayed until after important elections in France and Germany to ensure the so-called ‘twin engine’ of the EU has stable leadership

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, indicated in December 2016 that the negotiation period cannot span the entire two years due to the need to review and ratify the final agreement, and should take place between March 2017 and October 2018. While this is the goal of the British government – described as “absolutely ample” time by Boris Johnson – it is an unlikely possibility that everything will be agreed by then. Suffice to say, Barnier’s timetable has been complicated by the calling of a UK general election for 8 June, and EU officials now expect the official negotiating process to begin afterwards. Even prior to this, there had been suggestions that the talks may be effectively delayed until after important elections in France and Germany to ensure the so-called ‘twin engine’ of the EU has stable leadership. The Irish Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, has gone as far as to state that it will be ‘impossible’ for a deal to be drawn up completely by the time Britain formally leaves. This has led to speculation concerning the possibility of a transitional arrangement that would come into effect on Brexit Day in 2019, giving the negotiating teams more time to discuss the details without a looming deadline. Whether these further negotiations would last another two, five, or ten years is also up for debate.

the principle of freedom of movement is incompatible with her desire to control immigration

It will be no simple task to decouple the British political and economic machine from that of Europe. The most contentious area of discussion will doubtlessly be a free trade agreement, one that the British government hopes mirrors current access to the single market as much as possible. This is necessary given Theresa May’s indication that Britain will withdraw from the single market, citing that the principle of freedom of movement is incompatible with her desire to control immigration. Hostility from EU officials to the prospect of a special deal for Britain, not least the warning from Angela Merkel that there could be ‘no cherry picking’ by British officials, reinforces the notion that this will prove an extremely complicated area of negotiation. This is the case even without considering the need to negotiate a new relationship regarding financial services, in particular links between the City of London – the financial hub of Europe – and European financial institutions. The Sword of Damocles hanging over these negotiations, and indeed one openly mused about by the Chancellor, Philip Hammond, is the implicit threat that Britain could transform itself into a tax haven on Europe’s doorstep should the final agreement not provide adequate protections for the British economy.

the possibility of using EU citizens resident in the UK as so-called ‘bargaining chips’ to bolster the UK’s negotiating position

There is, of course, a non-economic dimension to the Brexit talks. There has been significant concern about the possibility of using EU citizens resident in the UK as so-called ‘bargaining chips’ to bolster the UK’s negotiating position. This has been roundly condemned, although, as recently as in January the Home Office’s stance was that no assurances would be given until similar assurances were given for British citizens in EU countries. Concerns closer to home, for instance the Erasmus programme for university students, poses a further risk to existing residents. Whilst Steve Smith, Exeter’s Vice Chancellor, has reassured European students that there will be ‘no immediate changes’ to their status, and Universities Minister, Jo Johnson, pledged his support for efforts to retain Erasmus membership, there have been no solid assurances.

Britain will leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice

Areas of further contention include May’s uncompromising assertion that Britain will leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, a controversial proposal for a divorce bill with a proposed sum of €60m, and the sensitive issue of the Irish border. The latter in particular will have significant effects domestically. Current commitments under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement removed border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, although Brexit raises new issues given the paradox between an open section of UK-EU border and Britain regaining control of immigration policy. The Leave rallying cry of ‘Take Back Control’ of the borders, unofficially adopted by the May government, is rendered moot if European citizens can simply cross the Irish border freely and enter the UK without checks. The inability of unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland to negotiate a stable devolved executive since January only complicates matters further.

the risk remains that Britain will be made an example of in order to beat back Eurosceptic sentiment in the rest of the EU

Regardless of whatever the deal looks like, Britain will be formally leaving the European Union in the spring of 2019. There will be testing times ahead for both negotiating teams on a myriad of issues, and it can be assumed that EU officials want to dissuade the prospect of an Independence May: Resurgence taking place in any other member state. With elections to the European Parliament scheduled to take place just months after Brexit takes place, the risk remains that Britain will be made an example of in order to beat back Eurosceptic sentiment in the rest of the EU.

There is little for the rest of us to do but to sit back and watch as the Brexit freight train slowly rumbles towards us for the next two years.

Brace for impact, but do please put the kettle on.